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FOUCHA V LoUIsIANA. THE DANGER OF
COMMITMENT BASED ON DANGEROUSNESS
I. INTRODUCTION
The release of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity
("insamty acquittee") inevitably invokes public protests. Much of
tis outcry stems from fear that a dangerous individual will be
placed back into society' The media perpetuates societal fears by
bombarding the public with stones about insanity acquittees and
reporting any crime they commit after release.2
Consideration of whether to commit insanity acquittees based
solely on their dangerousness reveals a tension between the legiti-
mate concerns of the public and the constitutional rights of the
individual a In Foucha v. Louisiana,4 the United States Supreme
Court weighed societal safety concerns against the due process and
equal protection rights of insamty acquittees. The Supreme Court
struck down a Louisiana statute which allowed confinement of
insanity acquittees, who were no longer mentally ill, solely on the
basis of their dangerousness to society 5
Foucha was the first case in which the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the continued commitment of insanity acquittees after they
are no longer mentally ill. In light of the four-one-four decision,
1. See A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 7-7.3 commentary at 7-373
(1980) [hereinafter A.B.A. STANDARDS] (noting "[ilt is undisputed that the public feels
threatened by the potential release of mental nonresponsibility [insanity] acquittees"). The
public may also perceive that the insanity acquittee has "gotten off' without punishment.
See James W. Ellis, The Consequences of the Insanity Defense: Proposals to Reform Post-
Acquittal Commitment Laws, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 961, 963 (1986) (recognizing that
public dissatisfaction with the insanity defense is fueled by the concern that too many
defendants are "getting off' or "going free").
2. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing misperceptions caused by
the selective reporting of crimes committed by insanity acquittees).
3. See discussion infra parts III, IV
4. 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
5. Id. at 1788-89.
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and Justice White's ambiguous plurality opinion, the constitutional-
ity of a statute providing for continued commitment based solely
on dangerousness is still unclear. Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion suggests that a narrower statute than Louisiana's may pass
constitutional muster.
This Note will analyze the Foucha decision and the constitu-
tionality of committing insanity acquittees based on their danger-
ousness. Part II discusses the failure of the Supreme Court to af-
ford the same equal protection and due process nghts to insanity
acquittees as have been afforded to civil committees. Part III dis-
cusses public safety considerations stemming from societal fears of
insanity acquittees. Part IV weighs the state's interests in public
safety against the due process and equal protection rights of insani-
ty acquittees; it concludes that even if a statute was sufficiently
narrow to reflect pressing public safety concerns related to the in-
sanity acquittee's continuing dangerousness, the constitutional issues
arising from such confinement would outweigh the government's
interest. The commitment of insanity acquittees based on their
dangerousness would open the door to a narrowing of the constitu-
tional rights of all individuals.
II. THE COMMITMENT OF CIVIL COMMITTEES AND INSANITY
ACQUITTEES: DISPARITIES IN TREATMENT
BY THE SUPREME COURT
While the Supreme Court has consistently protected the due
process and equal protection rights of civil committees,7 the Court
has not recognized the same constitutional rights for insanity
acquittees.' This dichotomy reflects societal feelings of fear and
6. Id. at 1789-90.
7. The term "civil committee," as used in this Note, describes an individual who has
been civilly committed to a mental institution after it has been established that they are
both mentally ill and a danger to themselves or others. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (discussing considerations applicable in defining a civil committee);
see also Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1190, 1993 n.1 (1974) (defining "civil commitment"). A state has a legitimate inter-
est in committing mentally ill individuals under its parens patrae power. Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). The state also has the authority under its police power
to protect society from the dangerous tendencies of mentally ill individuals. Id. See gener-
ally, John Q. La Fond, An Examination of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment,
30 BuFF. L. REv. 499 (1981) (providing an overview of theories justifying involuntary
commitment).
8. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 367 (1982) (affording different
standards for the commitment of insanity acquittees and civil committees). The disparities
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anger toward insanity acquittees who, arguably, have the worst of
both worlds.' Unlike prisoners who are sentenced for a definite
prison term, insanity acquittees may be confined indefinitely "
Furthermore, they lack the same procedural protections that have
been provided for their civil counterparts prior to commitment.1'
Abuse of the insanity defense may justify fewer constitutional
protections for insanity acquittees. However, based on the infre-
quency in which the insanity defense has been raised successful-
ly,'2 its alleged abuse is not a persuasive reason for affording in-
sanity acquittees lesser constitutional protections than civil commit-
tees.
The Supreme Court has recognized that there are significant
liberty interests at stake in any commitment. 3 In Specht v.
Patterson,4 the Supreme Court held that a state cannot involun-
tarily commit an individual indefinitely without a hearing on the is-
sues of present mental illness and dangerousness. The Court in
between civil and criminal committee rights endure despite the existence of the modem
insanity defense since 1800. See Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity
Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 781 n.5 (1985) (stating that the insanity
defense dates back to at least Rex v. Hadfield, 27 State Trials 1281 (1800)).
9. See June R. German & Anne C. Singer, Punishing the Not Guilty: Hospitalization
of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1011, 1011-12 (1976)
(arguing that insanity acquittees are doubly neglected: their mental illness denies them the
due process safeguards given to prisoners but their connection with the criminal justice
system diminishes their chance for release once they are sane).
10. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 368 (holding that a defendant who establishes by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity may be
committed to a mental institution automatically and indefinitely); see also infra notes 35-
46 and accompanying text (discussing Jones).
11. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 366-68 (holding that following an acquittal an insanity
acquittee, unlike a civil committee, can be committed automatically without proof by clear
and convincing evidence of present mental illness and dangerousness).
12. Despite public opimon to the contrary, virtually every empirical study of the in-
sanity defense indicates the defense is rarely successfully raised. See Ira Mickenberg, A
Pleasant Surprise: The Guilty But Mentally III Verdict Has Both Succeeded In Its Own
Right And Successfully Preserved The Traditional Role Of The Insanity Defense, 55 U.
CN. L. REv. 943, 967-69 (1987) (citing statistics from different jurisdictions, such as
Michigan, which demonstrated a 0.009% success rate of the insanity defense for all per-
sons accused of serious crimes over a five year period).
13. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967); see also Louise Dovre, Comment,
Jones v. United States: Automatic Commitment of Individuals Found Not Guilty by Reason
of Insanity, 68 MINN. L. REv. 822, 825 (1983) (asserting that the high standard of proof
required in civil commitment cases reflects the significance of the liberty interest at stake).
14. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
15. Id. at 610-11. The Colorado Sex Offenders Act provided that a person, convicted
of certain sex offenses, could be sentenced indeterminately if the trial court found that he
or she constituted a threat of bodily harm to the public or was a habitual offender and
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Specht stated that "commitment proceedings whether denominated
civil or criminal are subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause."' 6  In
Jackson v. Indiana,7 the Court stated that due process requires
that the nature of the commitment "bear some reasonable relation
to the purpose for which the individual is committed."'" The
Court in Jackson held that Indiana's statute allowing indefinite
commitment of a criminal defendant solely because of his incompe-
tency to stand trial violated the defendant's due process and equal
protection rights.' 9
The due process rights of civil committees were recognized in
O'Connor v. Donaldson2' and Addington v. Texas.2  In
O'Connor, Donaldson brought a suit alleging that being civilly
committed against his will for fifteen years violated us constitu-
tional right to liberty ' The Court held that a state could not con-
stitutionally confine a nondangerous mentally ill individual capable
of living peacefully in society' The Court noted that even if
Donaldson was initially committed because he was mentally ill and
dangerous, his commitment could not continue constitutionally once
the basis for commitment no longer existed. ' In Addington, the
Court held that due process requires a state to show by clear and
convincing evidence that an individual is mentally ill and danger-
ous before it can civilly commit the individual to a state mental
mentally ill. Id. at 607 (citing COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-19-1 to 10 (West 1963)).
Specht was sentenced under the Act for an indeterminate penod based on his conviction
for indecent liberties which carried a maximum sentence of ten years. Id.
16. Id. at 608.
17. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
18. Id. at 738. In other words, the procedures invoked to commit the individual and
the length of the commitment must further the state's articulated bases for commitment.
Id. at 737-38.
19. Id. at 730, 738. Jackson, a deaf mute with the mental level of a pre-school child,
was charged with two robberies totaling nine dollars in value. Id. at 717. Jackson was
found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to an institution until he was certifi-
ably sane. Id. at 718-19. After three and one-half years and with little chance of improve-
ment, Jackson argued that commitment under these circumstances amounted to a "life
sentence" and deprived him of his right to due process and equal protection. Id. at 719,
738-39.
20. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
21. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
22. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 564-65.
23. Id. at 576. The jury had found that Donaldson was not dangerous to himself or
others. Id. at 573.
24. Id. at 575 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) and McNeil v. Di-
rector, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 248-50 (1972)).
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hospital against his or her will."
In the seminal equal protection case Baxstrom v. Herald,'
the Court upheld the rights of all civil committees to be afforded
the same procedural protections. Baxstrom was certified as insane
while serving his prison sentence. After completing his sentence he
was civilly committed to a mental hospital without the opportunity
for the jury review provided to all other civil comrmttees in that
state and without a determination of any present mental illness.27
The Supreme Court held that, for purposes of civil commitment,
affording different procedures to persons nearing the end of a penal
term than for all other civil committees violated Baxstrom's equal
protection rights.2"
In Humphrey v. Cady,29 the Court adhered to Baxstrom in
holding that mentally ill, convicted cnrimnals could not be distin-
guished from mentally ill, law-abiding citizens beyond the duration
of the maximum sentence for the crime.3" Under the Wisconsin
Sex Crimes Act, Humphrey was committed to a mental institution
for a period equivalent to the maximum sentence of the crime for
which he was convicted.3' At the end of that period, his commit-
25. Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33. The judge committed Addington to a mental hospi-
tal based on a jury finding by "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence" that
Addington was mentally ill and dangerous. Id. at 421. The Texas Supreme Court rejected
Addington's claim that civil commitment proceedings required a standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt and held that a "preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof
satisfied due process. Id. at 422. The United States Supreme Court reasoned that the
preponderance of the evidence standard was insufficient to protect civil commitment can-
didates from erroneous commitment and that the individual's liberty interest in the out-
come of a commitment proceeding justified use of a more substantial standard. Id. at 427;
see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980) (holding that the involuntary trans-
fer of a convicted felon from a state prison to a mental institution without the appropriate
procedures to prove that he was mentally ill deprived him of liberty without due process
of law). The Court in Addington found that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
historically reserved for criminal proceedings was not applicable in civil commitment pro-
ceedings where the nature of the proceedings differed and there was a lesser risk of erro-
neous commitment. Addington, 441 U.S. at 428-31.
26. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
27. Id. at 110-11.
28. Id. at 110.
29. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
30. Id. at 510-11.
31. Id. at 507. The Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act provided that if the crime was "proba-
bly directly motivated by a desire for sexual excitement" a person could be committed to
the Department of Public welfare. Id. (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 975 (West 1971)). Spe-
cifically, if a court finds such sexual motivation, it may commit the defendant to the
Department for comprehensive mental and physical examinations. Id. If, as a result of
these examinations, the State establishes the need for specialized treatment by a prepon-
1993]
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ment was renewed for five years without the jury trial normally
afforded to civil committees under Wisconsin law 32 The Court
remanded the case for the evidentiary hearing the district court had
demed.33
The Court, however, has not recognized the same due process
and equal protection rights for insanity acquittees during commit-
ment proceedings as have been recognized for civil committees.'
In Jones v. United States,35 the Court held that an individual
could be confined automatically and indefinitely to a mental institu-
tion if found to be not guilty by reason of insanity by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.36 A judgment of not guilty by reason of
insanity was interpreted to establish the mental illness and danger-
ousness necessary to justify commitment.37 The Court concluded
that the Addington burden of proof by clear and convincing evi-
dence was not required to commit an insanity acquittee.3" The
Court reasoned that "the proof that he committed a cnnunal act as
a result of mental illness eliminates the risk that he is being com-
mitted for mere 'idiosyncratic behavior."'39 Therefore, a standard
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence comported with due
process for the commitment of insanity acquittees.
derance of the evidence, the court may commit the defendant (in lieu of sentence) for a
period equal to the maximum sentence authorized for the crime. Id.
32. Id. The Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act allowed a court to renew commitment at the
end of the initial treatment period if it found the defendant's discharge would be danger-
ous to the public because of the defendant's mental or physical deficiency. Id.
33. Id. at 517.
34. Foucha was the first Supreme Court decision to address the constitutionality of
release proceedings for insanity acquittees. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1783
(1992).
35. 463 U.S. 354 (1982).
36. Id. at 370.
37. Id. The Court also stated that the insanity acquittee could be confined until he
either had regained his sanity or was no longer a threat to himself or society. Id. This
portion of the Court's opinion constitutes dicta because the issue of release standards was
not before the Court in Jones. Id. at 363 n.11; see also Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1806-07
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that in Jones the Court was not called upon to decide
whether the procedures for the release of insanity acquittees were constitutional). If the
Court's statement was in fact part of the holding in Jones, it seems puzzling that after
Jones eleven states, in addition to Louisiana, expressly provided that insanity acquittees
should not be released as long as they were still dangerous. See id. at 1802 n.9 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (listing the statutes). But see id. at 1790 (O'Connor, J., concurng) (noting
that most states adopted release standards consistent with the Court and that Justice
Thomas' claim that eleven states had laws comparable to Louisiana was an exaggeration).
38. Jones, 463 U.S. at 367.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 367-68.
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Whether an insanity acquittee's equal protection rights have
been violated by state cominutment proceedings has never been
fully addressed by the Supreme Court. The Court in Jones sum-
marily addressed Jones' equal protection argument in a footnote to
the majority opinion.4 The Court stated that if the Due Process
Clause does not require the insanity acquittee to be given the same
procedural protections required in a civil commitment hearing,42
"there necessarily is a rational basis for equal protection purposes
for distinguishing between civil commitment and commitment of
insanity acquittees."" By automatically applying a rational basis
test, the Court avoided deciding whether a statute discriminating
against the class of insanity acquittees was deserving of greater
scrutiny "
Jones also argued that equal protection required a jury hearing
before commitment because a jury was allowed in a civil commit-
ment hearing.45 The Court replied that a jury determination was
not required before commitment because a jury made the initial
determination of Jones' sanity at the time of the offense.' The
Court focused on the past criminal trial and thus ignored possible
equal protection violations in regard to the insanity acquittee's
subsequent commitment to a mental institution. The Supreme Court
historically has failed to afford insanity acquittees the same due
process and equal protection rights throughout the commitment
process as have been afforded to civil committees.
mH. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PUBLIC SAFETY CONCERNS
The public safety concerns related to an insanity acquittee's
continuing dangerousness are significant and have had a great deal
of influence in the commitment context. Assessments and predic-
tions of an individual's dangerousness are an integral part of our
41. Id. at 362 n.10.
42. The Court later decided that these procedural protections are required. Id. at 367-
68.
43. Id. at 362 n.10. Because the equal protection argument "essentially duplicated the
petitioner's due process argument," the Court addressed Jones' equal protection argument
within its analysis of the Due Process Clause. Id.
44. For a discussion of whether insanity acquittees are a class deserving of greater
protection, see infra part IV.C.
45. Jones, 463 U.S. at 362 n.10. Jones was referrmng to the hearing provided by statute
fifty days after a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. at 360 (construing D.C.
CODE ANN. § 24-301(d)(2)(A) (1989)).
46. Id. at 362 n.10.
1993]
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legal system.4' In a number of decisions, courts have recognized
that public safety concerns regarding potentially dangerous individ-
uals are legitimate and have allowed the fact-finder to consider
predictions regarding future dangerousness despite the possible
inaccuracies of such predictions.4" For example, in Barefoot v.
Estelle,49 the Supreme Court ruled that psychiatric testimony pre-
dicting a defendant's future dangerousness was admissible when
imposing the death penalty, despite uncertainties about the accuracy
of such testimony" The Court believed that the defendant's re-
quest to prohibit predictions of dangerousness in capital cases was
47. See Elyce H. Zenoff, Controlling the Dangers of Dangerousness: The ABA Stan-
dards and Beyond, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 562, 562 (1985) (stating that "[a]ssessments
and predictions of dangerousness permeate every stage of the cnrmnal justice, juvenile
justice, and mental health systems"). Decisions involving a finding of dangerousness in-
clude: 1) conclusions regarding granting bail to persons accused of crimes and the level at
which bail is set; 2) decisions concerning the waiver of juveniles charged with serious
crimes to adult courts; 3) sentencing decisions following criminal convictions, including
release on probation; 4) decisions regarding work-release and furlough programs for in-
carcerated offenders; 5) parole and other conditional-release deterrmnations for offenders;
6) judgments regarding whether to remove a child from the home in child abuse or bat-
tery cases; 7) decisions to commit or release persons committed under quasi-criminal
statutes for sex offenses; 8) resolutions to civilly commit criminal defendants after having
been found incompetent to stand trial or when found not guilty by reason of insanity and
release procedures for these individuals; 9) decisions regarding the special handling of
disruptive prisoners; 10) decisions regarding the transfer of civilly committed patients to
hospitals with security; 11) commitment of drug addicts; 12) findings concerning the
emergency and long-term involuntary commitment of the mentally ill; 13) decisions con-
cerning conditional and unconditional release of involuntary committed mentally ill pa-
tients; 14) conclusions concerning the continuing hospitalization of criminal defendants
found not guilty by reason of insanity; 15) decisions to employ special legal provisions or
sentencing proceedings for habitual offenders; and 16) rulings to impose the death penalty.
S.A. Shah, Dangerousness: Conceptual Prediction and Public Policy Issues, in VIOLENCE
AND THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 151, 153-54 (J. Ray Hays et al. eds., 1981).
48. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-75 (1976) (recognizing that predicting future
behavior is difficult but still essential to decisions rendered in the criminal justice system).
There is still a great deal of controversy regarding the accuracy of predictions of danger-
ousness. The best clinical research based on institutionalized populations which have com-
mitted violence in the past and been diagnosed as mentally ill indicates that "psychiatrists
and psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of three predictions of violent
behavior." JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47 (Na-
tional Institute of Mental Health Monograph 1981).
49. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
50. Id. at 896-903. The Court noted that the defendant may counter any testimony
given and that it is the responsibility of the fact-finder to sort out unreliable information.
Id. at 898-99; see also Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274-76 (rejecting the claim that it is impossible
to predict future behavior and that dangerousness is therefore an invalid consideration
when imposing the death penalty).
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"somewhat like asking us to disinvent the wheel. '1 In the context
of pretrial detention, the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Daniels 2 held that danger to the community constituted a suffi-
cient independent basis for pretrial detention."
A current illustration of a highly publicized release proceeding
invoking public fears of the dangerousness of insanity acquittees is
the Michael Levine case. Levine was found not guilty by reason of
insanity of the aggravated murder of an elderly man, the attempted
aggravated murder of the man's wife, and associated kidnapping,
aggravated burglary and extortion charges.' Although Levine was
released in the summer of 1993,"s he endured a series of hearings
in which he was demed his freedom. His incarceration continued
despite the Oluo requirement that mental illness be present for any
involuntary commitment and the evidence indicating that he was no
longer mentally ill. 6 Levine's alleged dangerousness and the pub-
lic reaction to the gruesome crime appear to have influenced the
51. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896.
52. 772 F.2d 382, 383 (7th Cir. 1985).
53. Id. at 383. Daniels was detained pursuant to the Federal Bail Reform Act for dis-
tributing large quantities of controlled drugs in an operation that included bribing police
officers for protection. Id. at 382. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(c) (1992) (allowing
pretrial detention where the offense carries a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years
or more and is prescribed by three different controlled substance acts). The court stated
that Daniels "is being held on a conclusion that he is likely to commit more crimes on
release, not on a charge that he is likely to flee." Daniels, 772 F.2d at 383.
54. See State v. Levine, No. 56203, 1990 Ohio Ct. App. LEXIS 152 (Jan. 25, 1990)
(affirmung the trial court conviction of Levine on these counts). By comparison, Levine's
accomplice, John File, was found guilty of two counts of aggravated murder, one count
of attempted aggravated murder, two counts of kidnapping, one count of aggravated bur-
glary, and one count of extortion. State v. File, No. 41724 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 28,
1980). He was sentenced to life imprisonment on the first two counts, four to twenty-five
years on the third, fourth, fifth and sixth counts and one to ten years on the seventh
count. Id The Ohio Parole Board has requested that File's sentence be commuted to the
14 years he has already served. James F. McCarty, Parole Board Wants to Free Levine
Cohort, CLEVELAND PLAiN DEALER, October 15, 1993, at i-B.
55. Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3001 (1993).
56. In accordance with Ohio law, heanngs were held to determine if Levine should be
released in 1980, 1983 and 1988. Each time, Judge John Angelotta of the Cuyahoga
County Common Pleas Court determined that Levine remained mentally ill and subject to
hospitalization. See discussion of Ohio release hearing requirements in Memorandum in
Support of Respondent-Appellant's and Intervenor-Appellant's Motion For Stay of Order
Releasing Petitioner-Appellee at 4-5. See generally OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(H)
(Baldwin 1992) (governing requirements for release hearings). The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that there was no evidence to support Judge Angelotta's findings of insam-
ty; in fact, the court found "enormous and overwhelming evidence to the contrary." Le-
vine v. Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals, No. 92-3625/92-3712, slip op. at 6 (6th Cir.
1992).
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delay in his release." The media roused public sentiment by pro-
ducing story upon story about Levine, each time repeating the facts
of the crimes and alluding to his dangerousness.58 The stones
would also include a general discussion of the insanity defense and
would assert that Levine's case demonstrated the inefficacy of the
defense.59
The Michael Levine case demonstrates the impact that public
fear may have on the detention of insanity acquittees and the role
the media plays in strengthening such fear. Public fear appears to
be based almost exclusively on cases where a person was found
not guilty by reason of insanity of a homicide, attempted homicide,
or assault causing serious bodily injury o Not coincidentally, the
57. At Levine's 1983 hearing, Judge Angelotta focused on Levine's past crimes in
assessing whether Levine would commit violent acts in the future; he treated the evidence
that Levine was no longer mentally ill as nothing more than a "temporary" reussion.
Ohio v. Levine, Court's Supplemental Ruling, No. 47714 at 4-8 (Cuyahoga C.P Jan. 17,
1984). Likewise, the Ohio Court of Appeals characterized Levine's illness as in remission,
thus subjecting him to continued hospitalization. Ohio v. Levine, No. 47976 (Ohio Ct.
App. Oct. 25, 1984). The public reacted to Levine's July 6, 1988 release heanng by
sending a petition containing 4,500 signatures imploring Judge Angelotta to keep Levine
hospitalized. Record at 301, Ohio v. Levine, No. 56203 (Cuyahoga C.P July 6, 1988). In
addition, Judge Angelotta received letters from both the Ohio Congress and the United
States Congress stating: "[w]ithout reservation, I urge that you today rebuff any attempts
to release Michael Levine, the murderer of Julius Kravitz." Id. at 302. Upon learning of
Levine's pending release, the Ohio Attorney General's office and the Cuyahoga County
Prosecuting Attorney filed a motion for a stay of the district court's order to release
Levine. Respondent-Appellant's And Intervenor-Appellant's Motion For Stay Of Order
Releasing Petitioner-Appellee at 1, Levine v. Torvik, No. 92-3625/92-3712 (6th Cir. 1992).
58. See Appeals Court Halts Man's Release, UPI, June 30, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File (noting Ohio Attorney General Lee Fisher's concerns that Levine
is "a violent man" whose mental problems "could re-emerge" as evidenced by the threat-
ening letters he wrote to his former wife and the sentencing judge); see also Victim's
Widow Wants Killer Locked Up, UPI, June 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File (quoting Kravitz's widow as saying that she wants Levine incarcerated "so he
can't hurt anyone like he did my family"). Judge Angelotta was quoted often as saying
that Levine was dangerous and should be hospitalized. See, e.g., Levine Returned to Lima
State, UPI, Nov. 22, 1980, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (quoting Judge
Angelotta as saying that Levine should be hospitalized because "he is homicidal and
dangerous to others").
59. See, e.g., Lee Leonard, Ohio Lawmakers Rejected Elimination of the Insanity Plea
Two Years Ago, UPI, July 7, 1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (report-
ing that the bill creating a guilty but mentally ill verdict for Ohio was introduced in 1979
following Michael Levine's acquittal); see also Rosemary Armao, Ohio Senate Committee
to Speed Up Revision of State's Insanity Defense, UPI, June 22, 1982, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (noting that Michael Levine's insanity acquittal inspired a
bill that would add the guilty but mentally ill verdict to Ohio insanity defense law).
60. See David B. Wexler, Symposium on the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health
Standards: Redefining the Insanity Problem, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 528, 542 (1985)
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most highly publicized insanity acquittals are those involving honu-
cide and attempted homicide cases.6' Both the American Psycluat-
ric Association (APA) and the American Bar Association (ABA)
promulgated standards for the insanity defense in the wake of John
Hinckley's insamty acquittal for his attempted assassination of
President Reagan.62 Almost every state that has adopted a guilty
but mentally ill verdict has done so in reaction to a controversial
insanity acquittal or a violent crime committed by a recently re-
leased insanity acquittee.63 In Michigan, the first state to adopt the
guilty but mentally ill verdict, passage of the statute was sparked
by public outcry over a murder and rape committed by two insam-
ty acquittees within two years of their release.'
Public concern regarding safety has greatly influenced move-
ments to reform the insanity defense.' Tis concern centers on
the belief that insanity acquittees are often released prematurely 6
Critics doubt the ability of mental health professionals to predict
(stating that the public fear centers around these cases because the defendant's proclivity
toward danger has already been established).
61. See id. at 543 (stating that the media's selective reporting of homicide cases has
led to the myth that "most insanity defendants are murderers who commit random acts of
violence").
62. See American Psychiatric Association, Statement on the Insanity Defense in ISSUES
IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 12 (1984) [hereinafter A.P.A., Statement] (stating that the
Hinckley verdict was a catalyst for the APA's drafting of its first comprehensive state-
ment on the insanity defense); see also A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 3 (ex-
plaining that the trial of Hinckley resulted in the increased scrutiny of the role of mental
health professionals in the criminal justice system).
63. See Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose
Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 494, 497 (1985) (stating that
public outcry over violent crimes committed by insanity acquittees after their release trig-
gered adoption of the guilty but mentally ill verdict in Michigan, Illinois, Georgia and
Indiana). Id. at 495. A defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill is eligible for spe-
cialized treatment in a prison or mental hospital while incarcerated. Id. at 495. Thus, the
verdict provides the fact-finder with an option other than the traditional verdicts of guilty,
not guilty, and not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. See also A.P.A., Statement, supra
note 62, at 12 (remarking that following the Hinckley verdict, twenty bills were intro-
duced in Congress seeking to create a federal insanity defense which was more restrictive
than that employed by the states).
64. Slobogin. supra note 63, at 497.
65. See generally Ellis, supra note I (discussing proposals to reform commitment laws
for insanity acquittees in light of public perception of the consequences of acquittal by
reason of insanity).
66. See Morse, supra note 8, at 827 (emphasizing that the major concern of insanity
defense critics is the early release of insanity acquittees); see also Ellis, supra note 1, at
962 (asserting that the public's main concern regarding the insanity defense is not in as-
sessing blame but in determining when a defendant will get out).
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that insanity acquittees will no longer be a threat.67
Proposed reforms to the insanity defense have addressed pub-
lic concerns by including special release procedures for insanity
acquittees. In its official position on the insanity defense, the APA
declared that the decision to release an insanity acquittee should
not be a purely clinical judgment left to the discretion of mental
health professionals.6" The APA further suggested that acquittees
not amenable to treatment be transferred to a nontreatment facility
with the necessary security 69 The APA prefaced its official posi-
tion by stating: "The public's perception that a successful plea of
insanity is a good way to 'beat the rap' contributes to a belief that
the cnininal insanity defense is not only fundamentally unfair ('for
after all, he did do it') but also that insanity is a dangerous doc-
trine.,
70
Similarly, in formulating mental health standards, the Amen-
can Bar Association (ABA) adopted special commitment and re-
lease procedures for acquittees charged with violent crimes.7
These procedures include the insanity acquittees' ability to request
a hearing one year after his initial commitment (and at two-year
periods thereafter)72 or to obtain release upon petition by the su-
67. Morse, supra note 8, at 827.
68. A.P.A., Statement, supra note 62, at 1. The APA procedures apply only to individ-
uals charged with a violent crime. Id. The APA praised the Oregon system which has a
Psychiatric Security Review Board to decide who to release and recommit. Id., OR. REV.
STAT. § 161.327-336 (1985).
69. A.P.A., Statement, supra note 62, at 22.
70. Id. at 12. Recent causes for the public and psychiatric profession's concern about
the insanity defense include: the rapid release of insanity acquittees due to recent "civil-
libertarian-type" court rulings; the increased pleading and success of the insanity defense;
the use of anti-psychotic drugs to restore sanity; and the hardening of American attitudes
towards crime. Id. at 11.
71. See generally A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 7 (describing the commitment
and release procedures). The standards were incorporated into the more comprehensive
body of Association Standards for Criminal Justice which address a wide variety of cnr-
nal law and procedure issues. See Kenneth J. Hodson, The American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice: Their Development, Evolution and Future, 59 DENV. LJ.
3, 3-15 (1981) (providing the history of the standards' incorporation into the Association
Standards for Criminal Justice).
72. A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 7-7.8(a). Under this standard, the court can
set a shorter interval between petitions if warranted by the acquittee's mental conditions
and "other relevant factors." Id. At these review hearings, the state must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the acquittee meets the commitment criteria: 1) that the
acquittee is "currently mentally ill or mentally retarded" and 2) that "as a result, [the
acquittee] poses a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to others." Id. § 7-7A(b).
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perntendent of the facility7 3 When an insanity acquittee is re-
leased under these standards, he or she is under "authorized leave"
to permit a more tentative testing of his readiness to return to the
community74 Like the APA's standards, those of the ABA pro-
vide more rigorous and deliberate procedures preceding the release
of insamty acquittees. These procedures are in response to the per-
ceived threat to the public of releasing persons acquitted of violent
cnmes. Although the need for public safety plays an important role
in determining the propriety of releasing an insanity acquittee,
these safety concerns must always be weighed against the insanity
acquittee's constitutional rights.'
IV WEIGHING THE INSANITY ACQUITTEE'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST
IN PROTECTING SOCIETY
It may be argued that a statute permitting the detention of
insanity acquittees based on dangerousness does not infringe upon
their due process and equal protection rights. In Foucha, the plural-
ity reversed the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision to hold
Foucha but did not fully explore these constitutional issues. How-
ever, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion suggests that the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses do not prevent detaining
insanity acquittees based solely on their dangerousness where there
are adequate procedural safeguards."6 Tius view is mistaken. The
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution pro-
hibit any statute which permits continued confinement of an insani-
ty acquittee based solely on Is or her dangerousness regardless of
any procedural safeguards.
A. The Foucha Plurality Opinion
The Court in Foucha held that since Foucha was no longer
mentally ill, the State could not continue to hold him as an insani-
73. Id. § 7-7.9.
74. Ld. § 7-7.11.
75. See, e.g., Levine v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, No. C-3-85-493,
slip op. at 5 (S.D. Ohio June 25, 1992) (In deciding to adopt the Magistrate's decision to
release Levine, Judge Walter Herbert Rice held that under the authority of Foucha, the
Court had to order Levine's release due to the lack of evidence to support that he was
still mentally ill.).
76. See infra notes 154-67 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural safeguards
recommended by O'Connor to preserve an insanity acquittee's constitutional rights).
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ty acquittee.77 However, the Court did not go so far as to find
that the Due Process Clause prohibits a state from confining an
insanity acquittee based solely on his or her dangerousness." The
plurality opinion merely emphasized that the Louisiana statute was
lacking in the procedural protections necessary for continued con-
finement. 9 Therefore, in light of Justice White's ambiguous opin-
ion and the egregious facts of the case, it is still possible for an
insanity acquittee to face continued cominutment based solely on
dangerousness.
Following his cursory review of the constitutional rights of
insanity acquittees, Justice White concluded that there were three
difficulties with Foucha's continued confinement." First, White
stated that if Foucha was to be held, he should not be held as a
mentally ill person.8 ' This was because "due process requires that
the nature of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is comrmtted."82 Accordingly, the
Court left room for an insanity acquittee to be committed on the
basis of dangerousness as long as the commitment is not to a
mental institution.
Second, White explained that if Foucha was to be held in a
mental institution, he would be entitled to the same constitutional
protections afforded to a civil committee.83 This included a pro-
ceeding where his mental illness and dangerousness was proven by
clear and convincing evidence." Therefore, because Foucha was
no longer mentally ill, he could not be held in a mental institu-
tion."
Finally, White emphasized that substantive due process rights
77. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (1992).
78. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
79. See generally Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1784-89 (1992) (focusing on the absence of
procedural protections in the Louisiana statute to confine Foucha based on his dangerous-
ness).
80. Id. at 1784.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1785 (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) and Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)); see also supra text accompanying note 18 (dis-
cussing Jackson).
83. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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prevent arbitrary government action. 6 Because Foucha was not
convicted, he could not be punished. 7 The Court, however, did
not define pumshment and merely concluded that the State had no
punitive interest in detaining a person who had not been found
guilty 88 The issue of whether detaining an insanity acquittee
based on dangerousness was punitive was not specifically ad-
dressed. 9 In fact, the Court noted that "in certain narrow circum-
stances persons who pose a danger to others or to the community
may be subject to limited confinement."'9
The Foucha Court concluded that the pretrial detention of
arrestees, upheld in United States v. Salerno,9 was one of those
carefully limited exceptions. White asserted that unlike the Bail
Reform Act involved in Salerno,92 Louisiana's statute was not
sufficiently narrow to qualify as a "due process exception."'93 The
Bail Reform Act permits a judge to detain arrestees prior to trial
where it is established by clear and convincing evidence that they
are dangerous to the community ' The Louisiana statute, by con-
trast, placed the burden on the insanity acquittee to prove they
were no longer dangerous95 and permitted their unlimited deten-
tion if they failed to meet this burden.' In addition, the Bail Re-
form Act was limited to the detention of offenders of more serious
crimes (where the government interest in protecting society was the
strongest) unlike the Louisiana statute which failed to distinguish
between types of offenders.97
The Court's holding in Foucha can be confined to the deplor-
able facts of the case. Under Louisiana's statute, Foucha could
have been held indefinitely after being found not guilty by reason
of insanity for any criminal offense." At the time of his release,
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1786.
91. 481 U.S. 739 (1987); see Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1787 (noting that detention is one
of "those carefully limited exceptions permitted by the Due Process Clause").
92. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-50 (1992).
93. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786.
94. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(e), (f) (1992).
95. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786.
96. Id. at 1787.
97. Id. at 1786; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(e), (f)(1) (1992) (allowing detention for
crimes of violence, offenses punishable by life impnsonment or death, serious drug offens-
es and certain repeat offenders).
98. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1787 (1992). Foucha was found not guilty by reason of
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Foucha had already served over seven years in a psychiatric institu-
tion even though there had been no evidence of his mental illness
since his admission.99 Foucha's release was recommended in 1988,
approximately four years before the case came before the Supreme
Court."ro While Foucha was found to have an incurable antisocial
personality disorder, this diagnosis fell short of the definition of
mental disease.'0'
In addition, although he was being held on the basis of his
dangerousness, Foucha was never found to be dangerous. °2 Upon
the superintendent's recommendation for Foucha's release, the trial
judge appointed a sanity commission consisting of two doctors to
testify as to Foucha's present condition.0 3 Only one of the doc-
tors testified at the release hearing and he said that because of
some altercations Foucha was involved in, he would not "feel com-
fortable in certifying that [Foucha] would not be a danger to him-
self or to other people."'" Louisiana asserted that because Foucha
committed a criminal act and had an incurable personality disorder,
which sometimes led to aggressive conduct, he could be held in-
definitely 105 Justice White's noncommittal plurality opinion, as
applied to the specific, egregious facts of the Foucha case, thus
may leave room for continued confinement of insanity acquittees
based on dangerousness under a more narrowly drawn statute.
B. Due Process Analysis
To determine whether a statute providing for the continued
commitment of an insanity acquittee on the basis of dangerousness
insanity of the offenses of aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm. Id. at
1782.
99. Id. at 1782 (Foucha was committed in October, 1984 and released in May, 1992).
100. Id.
101. Id. Foucha does not expressly define what constitutes mental disease. Stedman's
Medical Dictionary defines mental disease or mental illness as "a broadly inclusive term,
generally denoting one or all of the following: 1) a disease of the brain, with predomi-
nant behavioral symptoms, as in paresis or acute alcoholism; [or] 2) a disease of the
.mind' or personality, evidenced by abnormal behavior, as in hysteria or schizophre-
nia " STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 450, 764 (25th ed. 1990).
102. Although a three-member panel from the institution was charged with determining
Foucha's dangerousness, "its report did not expressly make a finding in that regard.'
Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1782 n.2 (1992).
103. Id. at 1782.
104. Id. at 1782-84. It was stipulated at trial that the other doctor, if present, would
have given the same testimony. Id. at 1784. On the basis of the doctor's testimony, the
trial court found Foucha to be dangerous and committed him to a mental institution. Id.
105. Id. at 1787.
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violates the Due Process Clause, the Court should apply a two
prong test which has evolved from recent pretrial detention deci-
sions." 6 The first prong weighs the governmental interests sought
to be advanced by the statute against the intrusion into the funda-
mental rights of the individual to determine whether the statute de-
prives the individual of his or her "substantive" due process
rights."ec If the individual's interest outweighs the governmental
interest, then the statute is unconstitutional."' ° The second prong
of the test examines whether the procedural safeguards advance the
government's interest."
1. Substantive Due Process
The strength of the state interest needed to legitimize a statute
depends on the degree to which the statute encroaches upon an
individual's fundamental rights."' Although the Court has de-
scribed the right to be free from pretrial detention as "substantial"
and of an "importan[t] and fundamental nature," it has not recog-
nized this right as a fundamental right deserving of strict scruti-
nyIII
106. E.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). In Schall, the Court stated that two
separate inquiries were necessary to determine if a stite statute providing for preventive
detention of juveniles was compatible with the "fundamental fairness" required by due
process. Id. at 263. The Court upheld New York's preventive detention statute for juve-
niles under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment due to its regulatory
purpose and procedural protections. Id. at 281. These two inquiries also form the basis for
the Court's decision in Salerno. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987); see
also Michael W. Youtt, The Effect of Salerno v. United States on the Use of State Pre-
ventive Detention Legislation: A New Definition of Due Process, 22 GA. L. REV. 805,
814-20 (1988) (detailing the Court's application of the two-prong test in determining the
constitutionality of detention).
107. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979) (applying the first prong in
determining whether pretrial detention was regulatory or punitive); see also Schall, 467
U.S. at 263-74 (analyzing the first prong of the due process test).
108. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-66 (1973) (invalidating a state law forbidding
abortions because in the first trimester the woman's interest in privacy outweighed the
state's interest in protecting the unborn fetus).
109. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 263 (analyzing the second prong of the due process test).
110. See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259-60, 262-63 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) (discussing the balance between state interests and individual rights).
Ill. In Schall, the Court referred to the juvenile's interest in freedom from detention as
"substantial." Schall, 467 U.S. at 265. In Salerno, the Court made reference to the
"importan[t] and fundamental nature" of the right of an adult not to be detained but stat-
ed that the right to be free from pretrial detention cannot categorically be ranked as a
fundamental right. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1987). It is ironic that,
while recognizing an individual's strong interest in liberty, the Court in Salerno summarily
dismissed this interest in favor of the government's "legitimate" interest. Id. at 750.
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The Court in Salerno stated that "[w]e cannot categorically
state that pretrial detention 'offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.""' 2 Therefore, the Court determined that
it would apply the minimum rationality test to pretrial detention
cases, requiring only that the state prove it had a "legitimate"
interest which outweighed individual rights."3 Both the Schall
and Salerno courts recognized the legitimacy of state interests in
protecting communities from crime."4 Thus, applying the minm-
mum rationality test employed in Schall and Salerno, the insanity
acquittee's interest in freedom from restraint would be subordinated
to the state's legitimate interest in protecting society from danger-
ous individuals."5 The statute would be held valid on due process
grounds.
However, an insanity acquittee's freedom from continued
confinement based solely on his or her dangerousness is a funda-
mental right, the restriction of which must be justified by a com-
pelling state interest."' If "liberty" means anything, it means free-
dom from physical restraint absent a compelling governmental
interest."7 Freedom from bodily restraint has long been recog-
nized as "the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause ,118 Unlike in Schall and Salerno, where the Court
dealt with a very short period of detention," 9 the detention of an
112. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)).
113. Id. at 747.
114. Id., Schall, 467 U.S. at 264; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (stat-
ing "[o]ne general [governmental] interest is of course that of effective crime prevention
and detection "); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960) (holding that com-
batting local crime was a compelling state interest).
115. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750-51 (stating that, "where the government's interest is
sufficiently weighty, [the individual's strong interest in liberty can] be subordinated to the
greater needs of society.").
116. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (stating that, where fundamental rights
are involved, a limitation of these rights can only be justified by a compelling state inter-
est).
117. See, e.g., Schall, 467 U.S. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977)); see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564.
572 (1972)). But see Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1806 (1992) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that freedom from bodily restraint is not a per se fundamental right).
118. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979).
119. In Schall, the New York statute provided that if the juvenile denied the charges at
the initial appearance, a probable cause hearing must be held not more than three days
after the initial appearance or four days after the filing of a petition, whichever was soon-
er. Schall, 467 U.S. at 269-70. Once probable cause had been established, the juvenile
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insanity acquittee could last years in order to serve societal safety
interests. The insanity acquittee's deprivation thus rises to the level
of a fundamental right and therefore the government's interest in
protecting society must be compelling. Accordingly, the
individual's interests should be weighed against those of the gov-
ernment rather than being summarily dismissed as in Salerno.
The state will argue that protecting society from dangerous
insanity acquittees is a compelling interest which justifies the re-
striction of their rights. This approach, labeled a prediction-preven-
tion strategy, incapacitates persons thought likely to comnut crimes
before they have an opportunity to do so.' A forward-looking
assessment requires that prior violent acts be considered but these
considerations are not the sole basis for continued commitment.'2
There are many problems in employing a prediction-prevention
strategy Confinement based merely on a prediction arguably would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment as unconstitutional punishment
based on status." In addition, confinement based on dangerous-
ness unrelated to mental illness may be considered unconstitutional-
ly vague. The Supreme Court in Papachrtstou v. Jacksonville,24
was entitled to a fact-finding hearing not more than fourteen days after the initial hearing
for a felony and three days after the initial hearing for a lesser offense. Id. at 270. In
Salerno, the length of pretrial detention was limited by the time limitations of the Speedy
Trial Act. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987). See generally 18 U.S.C. §
3161 (1988) (governing "speedy trials").
120. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750-51.
121. See Alan M. Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predic-
tions, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24, 25 (1970) (stating that society has two main approaches to
discouraging behavior: the predictive-preventive approach which asks the question "[wlill
he do it?," and the punishment-deterrence strategy which asks "[d]id he do it?").
122. See Warren J. Ingber, Note, Rules For An Exceptional Class: The Commitment and
Release of Persons Acquitted of Violent Offenses By Reason of Insanity, 57 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 281, 287 (1982) (warning that focusing solely on the violent act which led to an
acquittee's commitment may result in retributive motives characteristic of the punishment-
deterrence strategy); see also Kathleen A. Kunde, Note, The Validity of the Dangerousness
Standard for Recommitment of Persons Found Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Disease or
Defect, 1980 WiS. L. REv. 391, 400 (stating that behavior in the institution would be one
factor a jury may consider in recommitting an insanity acquittee based on dangerousness).
123. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that a state law
which made the status of narcotic addiction a criminal offense was an unconstitutional
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments). The Court in Robinson recognized the strong state interest in regulating
narcotic drug traffic but stated that valid measures could be taken in place of the statute.
Id. at 664-66; see also Kunde, supra note 122, at 401 (arguing that recommitment of an
insanity acquittee based solely on dangerousness was recommitment based on status and
thus unconstitutional).
124. See Papachnstou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
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held that a statute may be struck down on grounds of vagueness if
it fails to provide adequate notice of wrongdoing." As the dan-
gerousness standard is a subjective standard with no valid criteria
for how dangerousness should be ascertained, it fails to provide
adequate notice of wrongdoing. 6 Therefore, under Papachristou,
any statute committing individuals based on dangerousness should
be void for vagueness.
Not only is a propensity toward future dangerousness hard to
define, but actual predictions of dangerousness are so problematic
as to make a dangerousness standard an unreasonable justification
for the continued deprivation of liberty 127 Studies show that the
ability of mental health professionals to predict dangerousness is
unreliable." An individual's commission of a violent act does
not necessarily lead to a propensity for committing future vio-
lence. 9 Therefore, the prediction-prevention strategy should be
limited in order to promote individual autonomy and assure that
125. Id. at 162 (holding that a vagrancy statute was void for vagueness because it
failed to give notice of what conduct was forbidden and encouraged arbitrary and erratic
arrests); see also Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (requirng that stat-
utes give fair notice of the offending conduct).
126. See Stjepan G. Meitrovi6 and John A. Cook, The Dangerousness Standard: What
Is It and How Is It Used?, 8 INT'L J. OF L. & PSYCHIATRY 443, 467 (1986) (stating that
"the value of the dangerousness standard is utilitarian, to control certain kinds of deviants,
but not others, and the truth of a person's dangerousness is actually created in the exami-
nation of the patient because there are no valid criteria for how it should be ascer-
tained"); see also Dershowitz, supra note 121, at 43 (concluding that each psychiatrist
decides for himself or herself what constitutes dangerousness).
127. See Bernard L. Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 439, 444 (1974) (stating that "[t]he fact that certain signs may sometimes be
associated with violent behavior in no way meets the legal need for criteria which
will discriminate between the potentially violent and the harmless individual.").
128. See Christopher Slobogm, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97,
110 (1984) (explaining that of those individuals predicted by mental health professionals
to be violent, anywhere from fifty-four to ninety-two percent were not violent over the
three to five year follow-up penods of the studies). The great number of erroneous pre-
dictions of dangerousness (called "false positive" rates) have been characterized as the
central problem in predicting dangerousness. Id. at 110-11. High "false positive" rates are
the result of both clinical and actuarial prediction methods. Id. at 110-11, 117-18.
129. See Harry L. Kozol et al., The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18
CRIME & DELINQ. 371, 383-86 (1972) (emphasizing that no single factor can predict
dangerous behavior); see also Barry Kirschner, Note, Constitutional Standards for Release
of the Civilly Committed and Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity: A Strict Scrutiny Analy-
sis, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 233, 274 (1978) (asserting that a past violent act committed by an
insanity acquittee is not indicative of future dangerousness any more so than a civil
committee's past dangerousness). But see MONAHAN, supra note 48, at 3-5 (concluding
that the history of violent behavior in an individual is the single best predictor of future
violence).
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arbitrary government action will not be taken against targets of
societal hostility or fear. 3 1
Moreover, recitation of a regulatory interest may disguise the
government's true, illegitimate interest in punishment.131 "[U]nder
the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be pumshed prior to
an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of
law ,13' An adjudication of guilt requires that both mens rea and
actus reas be proven so as to justify punishment. 33 Despite his or
her prior detention in a mental institution, an insamty acquittee has
not been adjudged guilty and thus the requisite findings of mens
rea and actus reas are lacking. The Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez'" described the factors traditionally considered to deter-
mine whether the government's act is punitive in nature:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding
of scienter, whether its operation will promote the tradition-
al aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether
the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether
an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be con-
nected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive
in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all rele-
130. See Ingber, supra note 122, at 300-01 (arguing that by not treating people as mere
objects of prediction, society promotes a sense of independence in both thought and action
and decreases the risk of chilling harmless behavior).
131. Salerno argued that the Federal Bail Reform Act violated substantive due process
because it was impermissible punishment. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747
(1987).
132. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (distinguishing a pretnal detainee from
a sentenced inate who may be punished as long as the punishment is not "cruel .and
unusual"); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) (holding that Four-
teenth Amendment liberty interests are implicated where school authorities punish a child
by restraining the child and inflicting appreciable physical pain); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (holding that persons cannot be subjected to punishment
at hard labor without a judicial trial to establish guilt).
133. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINciPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 18 (2d ed. 1960)
(stating that the principles of criminal law include: mens rea, actus reus, concurrence of
mens rea and actus reus, harm, causation, punishment, and legality); WAYNE R. LAFAVE
& AusTIN V. ScoT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2(b), at 8 (2d ed. 1986) (including mens
tea (guilty mind) and actus reus (guilty act) as basic principles underlying criminal re-
sponsibility in Anglo-American criminal law). But see Dershowitz, supra note 121, at 31-
32 (discussing the instances where a showing of mens rea and actus reus may not be
necessary as the basis of incapacitation including: times of emergency, pretrial detention
of arrestees, and civil commitment of the mentally ill).
134. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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vant to the inquiry, and may often point in differing direc-
tions. 35
In determining whether pretrial detention constituted impermissible
punishment, the Court in Salerno applied an empty, watered-down
version of the Kennedy test.'36 First, the Court looked to legisla-
tive intent.'37 In the absence of an express intention by the legis-
lature to punish, the Court next inquired whether an alternative
purpose could rationally be connected to the statute.' Since the
statute surpassed tus hurdle, then the Courts evaluated whether the
legislation appeared "excessive" in relation to this "alternative pur-
pose."
1 39
In applying this test, the Salerno Court disrmssed the possibili-
ty that the Bail Reform Act constituted punishment by relying
heavily on the legislature's declaration of intent. ° Inquiring
whether an alternative purpose may be assigned to a regulation is
therefore meaningless. The legislature would not admit its intent
was punitive and, where Congress is silent, some rational purpose
can always be found. 4'
A meamngful determination of whether a statute constitutes
punishment must therefore be based on a full examination of all
the factors in Kennedy, rather than the limited examination em-
ployed in Salerno.'42 Applying Kennedy, the statute allowing de-
135. Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted). Kennedy involved enforcement of a statute di-
vesting an American of citizenship for leaving or remaining outside the United States
during a time of war or national emergency for purpose of evading the draft. Id. at 186.
The statute was held to be unconstitutional as a punishment without the procedural safe-
guards guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Id.
136. The Court in Salerno stated that "the mere fact that a person is detained does not
inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment." Salerno,
481 U.S. at 746 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)); see also Youtt, su-
pra note 106, at 817-18 n.53 (discussing the Court's application of Kennedy test in
Salerno).
137. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. The Court concluded that the detention imposed by the Federal Bail Reform Act
was regulatory based on the legislative history recorded in the Senate Reports. Id. (citing
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 8 (1983)).
141. "If legislative intent is the sole determinant of pumshment, legislatures could
circumvent rights expressly protecting the individual from government authority
[which would result in] an empty conception of liberty." Marc Miller & Martin
Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. Rrv. 335, 367 (1990).
142. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text (discussing the Kennedy factors);
see also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980) (stating that the list of con-
siderations in Kennedy is "neither exhaustive nor dispositive").
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tention of insanity acquittees based on dangerousness would fail as
impermissible punishment. Detention based on dangerousness in-
volves an affirmative disability or restraint which appears excessive
in relation to the assigned purpose of protecting society Detention
based on dangerousness also promotes traditional aims of punish-
ment-deterrence and incapacitation.'43 The statute would focus
on individual behavior and responsibility-necessary elements of
punishment.'" Like the draft-evaders in Kennedy, insanity
acquittees are a class of people whom the community has histori-
cally desired to pumsh. ' Furthermore, incapacitation has been
regarded historically as punishment and no alternative purpose
could rationally be related to it which is disassociated from punish-
ment.'" A full consideration of the factors set forth in Kennedy
results in a determination that a statute permitting detention based
on dangerousness constitutes impermissible punishment.
Even if initially presumed to be regulatory, a statute imposing
an excessive length of detention would constitute impermissible
punishment. Unlike the statute in Salerno which limited detention
to the stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act, 47 a stat-
ute that permits the detention of an insanity acquittee may not
include such limitations. Even if a statute did stipulate time limita-
tions, at some point an insanity acquittee's internment becomes
punishment.141 The Court in Salerno stated: "[w]e intimate no
view as to the point at which detention in a particular case might
become excessively prolonged, and therefore punitive, in relation to
143. Detention based on dangerousness may also be in retribution for the past acts for
which the insanity acquittee escaped punishment. See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note
141, at 367 (determining that there are at least three kinds of government intent that
suggests a finding of punishment: retribution, deterrence and incapacitation).
144. See id. at 362-63 (distinguishing the selective service draft and compulsory edu-
cation laws from punishment because they are imposed universally on persons subject to
the law).
145. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 172-80; see also Wexler, supra note 60, at 545-46 (propos-
ing that legislatures, courts and the public hold insanity acquittees objectively responsible
especially where the consequences of their actions were severe).
146. See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 141, at 368-69 (noting that imprisonment is
the modem norm of punishment).
147. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987); see also Speedy Trial Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3161 (1988) (generally limiting the length of detention to 130 days following
arrest).
148. See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 141, at 368 ('The more severe and extend-
ed the deprivation of rights recognized under the Constitution or laws, the more the de-
privation will take on the character of punishment, and the stronger the government's jus-
tification should be.").
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Congress' regulatory goal."'49 Historically, an eight month incar-
ceration period has been regarded as punishment. 5° The Tenth
Circuit held that pre-trial detention intended to prevent flight before
trial constituted impernmssible punishment where the defendant had
been held for four months.' A statute which would allow an
insanity acquittee to be detained based on dangerousness would
need to allow for lengthy detainments to address public safety con-
cerns and would, therefore, constitute an impermissible punishment
under the Due Process Clause.'52
2. Procedural Due Process
Assuming that a statute allowing an insanity acquittee to be
detained does not violate substantive due process rights, the insam-
ty acquittee's procedural due process rights still should be consid-
ered. The proper inquiry is whether there are procedural safeguards
adequate to authorize the deprivation of liberty .. In her concur-
ring opinion in Foucha, Justice O'Connor suggested limitations on
the nature and duration of the detention of insanity acquittees-
limitations which would balance public safety concerns with the
individual liberty interest at stake." However, the greater number
of procedural restraints incorporated into any statute, the more
continued confinement of insanity acqulttees resembles punish-
ment.'55 Moreover, given an insanity acquittee's fundamental lib-
erty interest in freedom, no procedural safeguards could constitu-
tionally authorize the deprivation of that interest.
149. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 n.4.
150. United States v. Melendez-Camon, 790 F.2d 984, 1008 (2d Cir.) (Feinberg, C.J..
concumng), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 978 (1986). In Melendez-Camon, the court held
that pretrial detention based solely on dangerousness was unconstitutional. Id. at 1004.
Chief Judge Feinberg concurred only in result in regard to the two defendants who were
held for eight months based on dangerousness but stated that pretrial detention would not
necessarily be unconstitutional for a competent adult held for a brief period of time. Id.
at 1005.
151. United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510, 1516 (10th Cir. 1986).
152. But see infra notes 154-69 and accompanying text (discussing O'Connor's concur-
rence in Foucha which would allow for incarceration based on dangerousness provided
certain procedural matters are addressed).
153. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976) and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975)).
154. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1789-90.
155. For example, if the time an insanity acquittee could be detained, based solely on
dangerousness, was limited to that of a prison sentence for the same crime, and if deten-
tion was separate from other insanity acquittees, the detention would resemble the punish-
ment given to prisoners.
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O'Connor began her analysis with the proposition that absent
some medical justification, insanity acquittees could not be held as
mental patients because there must be a connection between the
nature and purposes of confinement."' The term "medical justifi-
cation" is vague; it would not serve as an effective procedural
safeguard because many "medical" conditions do not rise to the
level of mental illness. 7 Foucha's incurable, antisocial personali-
ty disorder would surely qualify as a "medical justification" but did
not meet the definition of a mental disease under Louisiana
law 15' Such a vague standard may be easily manipulated and its
use threatens to deprive an insanity acquittee of his or her liberty
interest in violation of procedural due process.'59
O'Connor accepted the idea of confining an insanity acquittee
based solely on dangerousness and merely took issue with the
continued confinement taking place in a mental institution."
O'Connor insinuates that insanity acquittees could be held in a
"dangerous person" facility once they are no longer found to be
mentally ill. 6 ' She also intimates that equal protection principles
may also linut the duration of commitment to no longer than the
time a person convicted of the same crime would be im-
prisoned. 62 The imposition of this procedural safeguard suggests
an intent to punish, for why else would someone found not guilty
156. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1789-90.
157. See AmRICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-III-R) 401 (3d ed. 1987) (defining mental disorders as a
"clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in a
person and that is associated with present distress disability increased risk of
suffenng death, pain or disability, [or] an important loss of freedom"). Deviant behavior
alone is not a mental disorder unless it is a symptom of dysfunction. Id.
158. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1782.
159. Holding an individual with "some medical justification" in a mental institution
absent a civil proceeding establishing mental illness and dangerousness would also violate
individual substantive due process rights. Id. at 1785; see also O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (establishing that an individual can be civilly committed only
after a finding of both the presence of mental illness and dangerousness).
160. See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It might therefore be
permissible for Louisiana to confine an insanity acquittee who has regained sanity if,
unlike the situation in this case, the nature and duration of detention were tailored to
reflect pressing public safety concerns related to the acquittee's continuing dangerous-
ness.").
161. As in Humphrey, where persons could be committed to a "sex deviate facility"
within the state prison, a "dangerous person institution" could thus be a separate facility
within the mental institution to confine only persons who are dangerous but not mentally
ill. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 506 (1972).
162. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1790.
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of an offense by reason of insanity be confined for the same dura-
tion as a prisoner found guilty of that offense9 Modeling an insani-
ty acquittee's detention after that of a convicted criminal would
suggest that the true intent in confining the insanity acquittee is
punitive and, therefore, would not pass a substantive due process
challenge.63
O'Connor further stated that the governmental interest in pro-
tecting society only outweighed the individual liberty interests of
those who committed violent crimes. t" She relied on Congress'
finding that those who commit violent crimes are more likely to be
responsible for dangerous acts in the community after arrest. 65
The flaw in this analysis, however, is that there is no basis for
concluding that insanity acquittees found not guilty of violent
crimes are any more dangerous than prisoners found guilty of the
same crime and released without a determination of current danger-
ousness." The means of continued commitment of insanity
acquittees who committed violent crimes therefore would not be
narrowly tailored to fit the objective of preventing dangerous acts.
O'Connor did not address the procedures the Court found de-
terminative in Salerno such as the opportunity for an adversarial
hearing, the state having the burden of proof, and the application
of the standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence. 67 A
163. See Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 141, at 368 (stating that "[t]he more severe
and extended the depnvation of rights recognized under the Constitution or laws, the more
the deprivation will take on the character of punishment").
164. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1790.
165. Id. (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750).
166. See Dershowitz, supra note 121, at 33 (emphasizing that "[riecent studies suggest
that the mentally ill do not, as a class, engage in more acts of violence than those not so
diagnosed").
167. In Salerno, the Court suggested that for a preventive detention statute to satisfy
procedural due process, the procedures used by a judicial officer to evaluate the likelihood
of future dangerousness must be specifically designed to further the accuracy of that de-
termination. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751; see also Youtt, supra note 106, at 827-30 (stating
that procedural due process concerns can be alleviated by incorporating federal statute
safeguards into state prevention detention legislation). The procedures in Salerno which the
Court said ensured the accuracy of predicting dangerousness at the detention hearing in-
cluded: 1) the detainee's right to counsel, 2) the right to testify, present information and
cross-examine witnesses, 3) statutorily enumerated factors other than the danger to the
community to guide the judicial officer, 4) a standard of proof by clear and convincing
evidence, 5) a statement of reasons for the decision, and 6) an opportunity for immediate
appellate review of the detention decision. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751-52. In addition, the
Court based its "disposal" of the respondents' facial challenge to procedural due process
on the premise that "there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future
criminal conduct." Id. at 751 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253. 278 (1984)); see
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statute like the one proposed by O'Connor would require an insani-
ty acquittee to convince the court that he or she is no longer dan-
gerous before being released. Yet an insanity acquittee being held
in an institution would not have an opportunity to establish the
necessary proof. In his dissent in Jones, Justice Brennan noted that
"extended institutionalization may effectively make it impossible for
an individual to prove that he is no longer mentally ill and danger-
ous, both because it deprives him of the economic wherewithal to
obtain independent medical judgments and because the treatment he
receives may make it difficult to demonstrate recovery "168 In ad-
dition, incorporating the Salerno protections into a statute providing
detention of insanity acquittees would produce strange results.
Because the procedural standards mandated by statute in Salerno
are also mandated in civil commitment hearings, applying these
standards to an insanity acquittee's detention would cloud the
Court's clear distinction between insanity acquittees and civil com-
rmttees.'69
Even if the additional procedures found determinative in
Salerno were required, 7' they would not ensure against erroneous
and unnecessary deprivations of liberty As the appellees in Schall
argued, the "risk of erroneous and unnecessary detentions is too
lugh despite these procedures because the standard for detention is
fatally vague.'' Like the provision in Schall which allowed for
the detention of a juvenile based on the "serious risk" that they
would commit a crime, any provision providing for detention
based on "dangerousness" would be arbitrary ..3 The Court in
also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-75 (1976) (arguing that prediction of criminal
behavior is an essential element in criminal justice which, while difficult to ascertain, is
not impossible).
168. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 381 n.16 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. The Court in Jones distinguished civil committees from insanity acquittees and
therefore held that the procedural protections afforded civil committees were not necessary
for the commitment of insanity acquittees. Id. at 367. This may not be a very strong
argument, however, because one of the distinctions the Court made between civil commit-
tees and insanity acquittees was that with insanity acquittees there was no risk of being
committed for mere "idiosyncratic behavior." Id. Where a hearing is held solely for the
purpose of determining an insanity acquittee's dangerousness, this risk may arise thus
justifying the higher standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Cf. Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (requiring a clear and convincing standard of proof to
civilly commit an individual to a mental hospital).
170. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
171. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984); see also supra notes 125-26 (arguing
that the criteria used to establish the dangerous standard is vague).
172. Schall, 467 U.S. at 278.
173. See Meitrovid & Cook, supra note 126, at 466 (concluding from an examination
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Schall and Salerno dismissed a vagueness argument upon the as-
sumption that, from a legal point of view, a prediction of future
criminal conduct is attainable. 74 Numerous studies show that this
assumption is necessarily flawed. 7 5 The Court in Schall was also
influenced by the existence of post-detention remedies which pro-
vided a sufficient mechanism for correcting errors on a case-by-
case basis.'76 Whereas the only harm a pretrial detainee suffers
would be confinement for a few days or months before trial, 177
an insanity acquittee may be confined erroneously for years during
an appeals process.
Furthermore, procedures which are more narrowly tailored
would achieve the end of protecting society without depriving the
insanity acquittee of his or her freedom. Conditional release would
protect society without infringing upon the insanity acquittee's due
process rights. An insanity acquittee could be closely monitored for
signs of recurring mental illness and hospitalized immediately if
such signs are observed. 7 1 Increased police protection and com-
of the civil commitment criteria in all fifty states that there are no limits or regulations
placed on the criteria).
174. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987); Schall, 467 U.S. at 278-80.
175. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties in predicting
an individual's future dangerousness).
176. Schall, 467 U.S. at 280-81. Post-detention remedies under the New York statute
included: a review of the pretrial detention order by writ of habeas corpus brought in the
state supreme court, reviewability of the state supreme court's ruling, permissive appeal
from a family court order by the appellate court and a motion for reconsideration directed
to the family court judge. Id.
177. In Schall, the maximum possible detention before trial for a serious crime was
seventeen days and, for a less serious crime, six days. Id. at 270; see also Speedy Trial
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1988) (providing generally for the trial of a defendant within a
maximum of 130 days following arrest). But see Allen Daniel Applebaum, Note, As Time
Goes By: Pretrial Incarceration Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and the Speedy Trial
Act of 1974, 8 CARDOZo L. REv. 1055, 1083 (1987) (arguing that loopholes in the
Speedy Trial Act could allow for a detention for more than eight months thereby resulting
in possible due process violations).
178. See German & Singer, supra note 9, at 1068 (advocating conditional release as an
important treatment tool because it allows doctors to monitor patients and slowly lift
restraints on their freedom). Michael Levine's release was ordered pursuant to conditions
recommended by a psychiatrist. Levine v. Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals, No. 92-
3625/92-3712, slip op. at 5 (6th Cir. 1992). The conditions included: 1) that Levine reside
in a different county than the victim's family; 2) that he receive follow up treatment once
every two weeks at a community mental health center or from a pnvate psychologist or
psychiatrist; 3) that the court be notified within 24 hours if Levine missed an appointment
without an excuse; 4) that the person giving follow up treatment to Levine write progress
reports to the court once every six .months; and 5) that in the case of any signs of men-
tal deterioration he is immediately rehospitalized and the court is informed within 24
hours. Id. at n.9.
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munity crime watch organizations could further protect society
from dangerous individuals. The fundamental nature of an insanity
acquittee's right to be free from restraint dictates a level of proce-
dural protection unattainable in any detention based solely on dan-
gerousness.
C. Equal Protection Analysis
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees that people who are
similarly situated will be treated similarly 179 As in Jones, the
Court in Foucha took only a cursory look at the equal protection
rights of insanity acquittees. '8 A full analysis under the Equal
Protection Clause should focus on the "suspect" nature of possible
classifications and the corresponding level of scrutiny applicable to
a statute which discriminates against these classifications."
In the portion of his opinion that commanded only three other
votes, Justice White concluded that the Louisiana statute discnmi-
nated against Foucha in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.' He first argued that the State failed to put forward a
"particularly convincing reason" for treating insanity acquittees who
were no longer mentally ill differently than prisoners who had
completed serving sentences for the same crime.' Next, he com-
pared the Louisiana statute with the procedural protections afforded
to civil comlmttees."' He emphasized that because civil commit-
ment requires establishing mental illness and dangerousness by
clear and convincing evidence, Louisiana could not confine Foucha
without meeting this burden.'85 Thus, Justice White left open the
possibility that if a convincing reason was provided by the State
and dangerousness was proven by a standard of clear and convinc-
179. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.1, at 1438 (2d ed.
1988); see also U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.").
180. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 n.10 (1982).
181. The analysis under the Equal Protection Clause is similar to the analysis under the
Due Process Clause where there are inequalities bearing on a fundamental right of indi-
viduals. TRIBE, supra note 179, at 1454; see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. RO-
TUNDA, CONSTITrTONAL LAW § 11.4 at 371 & n.174 (4th ed. 1991) (explaining that
courts can use a due process or equal protection analysis since "virtually all government
laws regulating fundamental rights involve classifications").
182. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1788 (1992). Justices Blackmun, Souter and
Stevens joined Justice White on this part of the opinion. Id. at 1781.
183. Id. at 1788.
184. Id. at 1788-89.
185. Id.
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Ing evidence, detention based on dangerousness may not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
The constitutionality of detaining insanity acquittees based on
their dangerousness depends on the level of scrutiny that courts
would apply in reviewing the statute. Historically, the mentally ill,
as a group, have been the victim of discrimination 85 and have
lacked political representation.'87 Therefore, any regulations sin-
gling them out as a class should be treated as suspect.'88 Insanity
acquittees who are no longer mentally ill have an even stronger
case for protection as a suspect class. A statute which provides
differential treatment for a class of persons with reduced capabili-
ties may be presumptively valid.'89 Where mental illness is no
longer present, however, continued discrimination reflects only
prejudice and antipathy and should require compelling justifica-
tion. 9 °
Convincing a court to categorize insanity acquittees as a "sus-
186. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980) (recognizing that commitment
to a mental hospital "can engender adverse social consequences to the individual" which
can be labeled "stigma") (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979)); see
also Dershowitz, supra note 121, at 40 (suggesting that the mentally ill have historically
been committed because they "were regarded as intolerably obnoxious to the community");
German & Singer, supra note 9, at lo1l (stating that insanity acquittees have been stig-
matized by society "as both criminal and mentally ill-twice-cursed as mad and bad").
187. See Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1259
(1973) (arguing that the political impotence of the mentally ill is manifested by: depnva-
tion of the right to vote, differentiation as minorities in society, regular consignment to
insularity because of minority status and victimization by ill-fitting legislative
classifications).
188. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (holding that strict
scrutiny should be applied to discrete and insular mnorities such as aliens); see also
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (holding that whenever the state regula-
tion weighs heavily on a group or individual, the Court should examine the policy closely
under the Equal Protection Clause). The application of stricter judicial scrutiny to a statute
discriminating against a class lacking political representation dates back to the famous
Carolene Products footnote. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4
(1938). In Carolene Products, Justice Stone suggested more exacting judicial scrutiny be
applied where "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condi-
tion, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities." Id.
189. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (explain-
ing that the reduced ability of the mentally retarded to function in the everyday world
justifies the State in treating the mentally retarded differently).
190. See id. at 440 (stating that a statute which classifies by race, alienage or national
origin, can reflect only prejudice and antipathy and is thus strictly scrutinized); see also
U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (treating with suspicion a
statute which had a true legislative purpose of preventing "hippies" from participating in
the food stamp program).
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pect" class may, however, be difficult. Courts have never used
strict scrutiny in a commitment case, 9' and the mentally ill have
never been labeled a suspect class.92 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to expand the current number of recog-
nized "suspect" classes and would likely be reticent to do so
now
Treating insanity acquittees as a "quasi-suspect" class is a
viable alternative. Classification as a "quasi-suspect" class would
force the courts to assess the constitutionality of any statute affect-
ing insanity acquittees with intermediate scrutiny; this would re-
quire the government to justify differential treatment by proving it
is substantially related to an important state objective." Interme-
diate scrutiny would protect an insanity acqmttee's individual rights
from improper legislative motives and public hostility "' Interme-
diate scrutiny is appropriate for insanity acquittees because they
have an immutable characteristic which makes them different from
the general public; in addition, they are targets of public prejudice
who lack recourse to the political process.'96
191. Hickey v. Moms, 722 F.2d 543, 545-46 (9th Cir. 1983). The court has applied
strict scrutiny in a commitment case but the equal protection question was presented apart
from its involuntary commitment aspect. See United States v. Cohen, No. 81-1036, slip
op. at 5-6 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 1982) (examining a federal commitment statute which, as
applied, imposed a burden on District of Columbia residents that was not imposed on
other citizens of the United States).
192. The Court thus far, has only treated classifications which are based on race, alien-
age and national origin as fully "suspect." See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to a city plan favoring businesses
owned by black, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Latin-Americans, Eskimos or Aleut citizens);
cf Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981) (holding it unnecessary to reach the
issue of whether mental illness is a suspect class since the statute which denied federal.
comfort allowances to certain inmates of public mental institutions did not classify directly
on the basis of mental health).
193. See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (de-
clining to extend heightened review to differential treatment based on age); James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971) (rejecting strict scrutiny of classifications based on
poverty); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977) (stating that: "[alan indigent
woman desiring an abortion does not come within the limited category of disadvantaged
classes so recognized by our cases").
194. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (articulating the "intermediate" scru-
tiny test as applied to gender classifications).
195. See Ingber, supra note 122, at 294 (discussing equal protection review of criminal
commitment procedures in order to guard against improper legislative motives).
196. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (noting a pattern of discrimination
against the mentally ill as a group and their lack of political representation); cf. Cleburne
v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (holding that mental retardation was
not a quasi-suspect classification which required a higher standard of judicial review).
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As previously discussed, the reasons for granting the class of
"insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill" quasi-suspect
status are even more compelling than granting such status to all
mentally ill persons. 97 Unlike in Cleburne, where the reduced
ability of the mentally retarded to function in society was a reason
invoked by the Court for not treating them as a quasi-suspect
class,'98 insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill are ful-
ly capable of functioning in society In addition, the legislative
protections designed to prevent prejudice based on mental retarda-
tion are absent for insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally
ill.' The "real and undeniable differences" between the mentally
retarded and other members of society cannot be applied to a
"sane" insanity acquittee whose only distinction from other mem-
bers of society lies in his or her past behavior.'r ° However, the
Court has hesitated to extend the protection of being labeled a
quasi-suspect class to the mentally ill and therefore may avoid
attaching this label to insanity acquittees as well.2"'
The next option for the Court is to apply a form of "height-
ened" scrutiny to legislation affecting the class of insanity
acquittees or, more narrowly, the class of "insanity acquittees who
are no longer mentally ill."'2 2 When applying a "heightened"
scrutiny test, the Court inquires "whether the challenged distinction
rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose."2 3
The state objective must be "nonillusory" and the Court will not
supply any "imaginary basis or purpose" to sustain the statutory
197. See discussion supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
198. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
199. See id. at 443-44 (listing as examples national acts preventing discrimination
against the mentally retarded in federally funded programs and state acts conferrng upon
the mentally retarded the right to live in a setting suited to their needs and abilities).
200. Id. at 444.
201. See id. at 445-46 (explaining that if the Court were to label the mentally retarded
as quasi-suspect, other groups such as the aged, disabled, mentally ill, and infirm would
also require such a classification). See generally Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 231
n.13 (1981) (by deciding that the statute did not "classify directly on the basis of mental
health," the five-justice majority avoided deciding what standard of review applies to
legislation "expressly classifying the mentally ill as a discrete group").
202. This heightened scrutiny approach has been defined as the "newer equal protec-
tion." See generally Gerald Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972)
(explaining that the "newer equal protection" seeks to raise the minimum rationality test
slightly to give it "bite" but does not raise the scrutiny all the way up to the levels of
intermediate or strict scrutiny).
203. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973) (emphasis added).
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scheme.'
"Heightened" scrutiny has been applied, under the guise of a
rational basis test, to invalidate legislation differentiating the classes
of the mentally ill and the mentally retarded. 5 In cases involving
the commitment of the mentally ill, the Supreme Court invalidated
the classifications using the normally deferential language of the
rational basis test.' In his dissenting opinion in Schweiker v.
Wilson,' Justice Powell applied heightened scrutiny to a statute
classifying on the basis of mental illness stating that "[t]his mar-
ginally more demanding scrutiny indirectly would test the plausibil-
ity of the tendered purpose, and preserve equal protection review
as something more than 'a mere tautological recognition of the fact
that Congress did what it intended to do.""'2 8 In the involuntary
commitment context, the Ninth Circuit applied heightened scrutiny
to evaluate whether the disparity between procedures for the com-
nutment and release of insanity acquittees and civil committees was
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.2" Heightened scrutiny
204. Id. at 276-77.
205. See John B. Scherling, Recent Development, Automatic and Indefinite Commitment
of Insanity Acquittees: A Procedural Straitjacket, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1233, 1254 (1984)
(arguing that because the Supreme Court invalidated the statutes in Baxstrom, Humphrey
and Jackson based on the rational basis test, the Court should apply intermediate scrutiny
to classifications of commitment procedures).
206. See, e.g., Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966) (stating that equal protec-
tion requires "that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which the
classification is made"); see also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670
(citing Baxstrom as a case where the protection of a fundamental right justified heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause).
207. 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
208. Id. at 245 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980)). Justice Powell's dissent was joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Stevens. Id. at 239. Powell proposed that, where there is no legislative
history, the classification must bear a 'fair and substantial relation' to the asserted pur-
pose. Id. at 245. Powell concluded that "Congress had no rational reason for refusing to
pay a comfort allowance to [the challengers], while paying it to numerous otherwise
identically situated disabled indigents.' Id. at 247.
209. Hickey v. Moms, 722 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1983). The court in Hickey held
that the challenged classifications were substantially related to important governmental
objectives and therefore upheld the statute as constitutional. Id. at 547. The Court's appli-
cation of what it called a "heightened rational basis" test thus resembled what has been
defined in this note as intermediate scrutiny. Supra note 194 and accompanying text. The
Hickey court used a "heightened rational basis" test because of the Supreme Court's use
of rational basis language to invalidate statutes in previous cases. Id. at 546; see also
Benham v. Edwards, 678 F.2d 511, 515 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying heightened scrutiny to
decide an equal protection challenge to Georgia's procedures governing commitment and
release of insanity acquittees), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Ledbetter v. Benham,
463 U.S. 1222 (1983).
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has also been applied to statutes differentiating the mentally
retarded.21 Although hesitant to label the mentally retarded as a
type of suspect class, the Court in Cleburne invalidated an ordi-
nance singling them out while applying a rational basis test.2 '
The heightened scrutiny utilized by the Court to review statutes
affecting the mentally ill and mentally retarded should also be
applied to statutes differentiating insanity acquittees or the class of
"insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill." This class
often includes mentally retarded and mentally ill individuals and,
notwithstanding a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, they
should still be afforded the same constitutional protections.2 2
Likewise, since "insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill"
belong to the class of insanity acquittees, both classes should be
afforded the same constitutional protections. By applying "height-
ened" scrutiny to legislation distinguishing insanity acquittees or
"insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill," the Court can
avoid expanding the group of "quasi-suspect" classifications while
still protecting insanity acquittees from legislation furthering a
hidden, illegitimate state purpose.
Courts have occasionally applied the rational basis test in the
commitment context21 3 but statutes reviewed under this level of
210. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446-48 (1985) (invalidating a
statute discnminating against the mentally retarded using a rational basis test).
211. Id. at 448.
212. To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, all jurisdictions require some
finding of mental disease or defect. See A.P.A., Statement, supra note 62, at 7-10 (de-
scribing the different standards for the insanity defense). In Foucha, Louisiana law provid-
ed a traditional statement of the M'Naghten test: "If the circumstances indicate that be-
cause of a mental disease or mental defect the offender was incapable of distinguishing
between right and wrong with reference to the conduct in question, the offender shall be
exempt from criminal responsibility." Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1794 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(quoting LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:14 (West 1990). The M'Naghten test is used by one-
third of the states. A.P.A., Statement, supra note 62, at 9. The American Law Institute
test, adopted in all federal jurisdictions, and half the states, provides: "A person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality (wrong-
fulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." Id.
(citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962)).
213. See People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040, 1051-52 (Colo. 1981) (asserting that people
found not guilty by reason of insanity are not a "suspect class," and therefore, the ratio-
nal basis test should be applied). The Court's dicta in Jones suggests that classifications
that distinguish between civil and insanity acquittees only deserve a rational basis test.
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 n.10 (1983); see also Scherling, supra note
205, at 1253 (discussing the Court's application of the rational basis test in Baxstrom and
other cases).
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scrutiny are generally ones which involve economc issues.14 Be-
cause of an insanity acquittee's important liberty interest in free-
dom from restraint, the Court should not apply a rational basis test.
A rational basis test is merely a rubber stamp of constitutional-
ity2 ' and would do little to protect insanity acquittees from being
the victims of societal rage and fear.
The government's interest in protecting the community from
dangerous individuals may be strong enough to pass whatever level
of scrutiny the Court applies. If "heightened" scrutiny is applied,
the government interest in protecting society from dangerous indi-
viduals is a legitimate purpose which justifies differential treatment
between insanity acquittees and civil committees, provided this
interest is articulated by the legislature.2"6 The government's inter-
est would probably be classified as an important interest if the
Court applied intermediate scrutiny Given the amount of crime in
our society, the government's interest may even be considered
compelling enough to survive strict scrutiny 2.7 Even if a statute
allowing detention of insanity acquittees based on dangerousness
met the requisite government interest, however, such a scheme
would still fail because the means could not be narrowly drawn to
fit the government's end of protecting society
Insanity acquittees, like civil committees, have been confined
for the safety of themselves or the community and have not been
convicted of wrongdoing. To determine whether a statute violates
equal protection, the rights of insanity acquittees should thus be
evaluated in comparison with the rights of civil committees.2"'
214. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 486 (1955) (applying the
rational basis test to economic regulation of opticians); see also Railway Express Agency
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (applying the rational basis test to a statute
regulating advertisements on business vehicles).
215. United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1201 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied.
499 U.S. 963 (1991); see also TRiBE, supra note 179, at 1443 (stating that the rational
basis test gives "remarkable deference to state objectives").
216. In Schall the Court concluded that preventing danger to the community is a legit-
imate regulatory goal. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984). Therefore, it is unnec-
essary to evaluate the statute under a rational basis test since it has already been estab-
lished that a genuine application of the test almost always results in a finding of con-
stitutionality. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
217. In Salerno the Court stated that the "government's interest in preventing crime by
arrestees is both legitimate and compelling." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 749
(1987).
218. See Ingber, supra note 122, at 290 (equating an insanity acquittal with a form of
civil status). In both Jones and Foucha, the Court compared the procedural protections
granted to civil committees with those granted to insanity acquittees for purposes of de-
1993]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The classification scheme allowing for greater confinement of in-
sanity acquittees than of civil committees would be both over and
under inclusive." 9 The statute would be underinclusive for the
purpose of protecting society because civil committees can be more
dangerous than insanity acqmttees.220  The statute would be
overlnclusive because inaccuracies in the prediction of dangerous-
ness would lead to the continued commitment of insanity acquittees
who were not dangerous.22" ' Essentially, the only difference be-
tween the two classes of individuals may be that the state reached
the civil committee before he committed a crime or because civil
rather than criminal proceedings were instituted.' An insanity
acquittee who is no longer mentally ill deserves the same proce-
dural rights as a civil committee: the state should have to prove by
a nuimum standard of clear and convincing evidence that he or
termining the equal protection rights of insanity acquittees. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 112
S. Ct. 1780, 1788-89 (1992) (emphasizing that the civil commitment burden of proving
mental illness and dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence should be applied to
prove dangerousness of insanity acquittees for purposes of continued confinement); see
also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 n.10 (1983) (stating that equal protection
does not require the granting of the same procedural safeguards to both civil commitment
candidates and insanity acquittees).
219. The Court rarely invalidates an underinclusive law. TRIBE, supra note 179, at 1448
n.11. Such schemes are validated on the basis that legislatures are allowed to solve prob-
lems "one step at a time." Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110
(1949). Arguably, however, an underinclusive law should be subject to real judicial review
because of the possibility of leaving out the politically disadvantaged. See id. at 112-13
(Jackson, J., concumng) ("Nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to
allow officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation
and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger num-
bers were affected."). A law that is overnclusive is flawed because it does not protect
individual liberties and should arguably be given intermediate scrutiny. See TRIBE, supra
note 179, at 1450 n.22 (stating that courts must display heightened sensitivity to the risk
that overinclusive measures may rest upon stigmatizing stereotypes).
220. See Note, Commitment and Release of Persons Found Not Guilty By Reason of In-
sanity: A Georgia Perspective, 15 GA. L. REv. 1065, 1079 n.78 (1981) (stating that
"[s]cientific studies, while not conclusive, do indicate that [insanity acquittees] as a group
are not substantially more dangerous than their civilly committed counterparts"); see also
Diamond, supra note 127, at 444-47 (citing statistical studies which demonstrate the unre-
liability of psychiatric predictions of dangerousness).
221. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties in predicting
dangerousness).
222. Scherling, supra note 205, at 1256; see also German & Singer, supra note 9, at
1023 (pointing out that hospitalization, rather than being charged with a crime, may have
been instituted for civil committees). Another difference may be that the civil committee
was incompetent to stand trial and was therefore not tried. Cf. Dusky v. United States,
362 U.S. 402. 402 (1960) (holding that a defendant must be competent to stand trial
before being convicted). Competence includes the ability of the defendant to understand
what he or she is on trial for and to help prepare a defense. Id.
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she is mentally ill and dangerous.' Because there can be no
proof of mental illness, continued confinement of an insanity
acquittee on the basis of dangerousness alone would be a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.
The disparity in treatment between insamty acquittees who are
no longer mentally ill and prisoners convicted of the same crime
who have finished serving their sentences would also violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Like the convicted criminal, an insanity
acquittee has been charged with a criminal offense and given the
procedural protections of the criminal process.' A statute pro-
tecting society by confining insanity acquittees and not persons
convicted of the same crime would be both over and
undernclusive. The statute would be underinclusive because con-
victed criminals can be more dangerous than insanity acquittees
and should therefore also be confined based on their dangerousness
in order to protect society adequately' The statute would be
overinclusive because many insanity acquittees are not as dangerous
as many convicted criminals who are released following completion
of a prison sentence.2
In her concurring opinion in Foucha, Justice O'Connor recog-
nized a possible equal protection conflict between holding an insan-
ity acquittee who is not mentally ill longer than a person convicted
of the same crimes. 7 O'Connor suggested that to remedy this
conflict, a statute may have to provide that an insanity acquittee's
sentence can be no longer than the prison sentence he or she
would have served had he or she been found guilty 22 Even if an
insanity acquittee were held no longer than if he or she had been
found guilty, such a statute would, by its nature, still violate the
223. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979) (holding that a clear and
convincing standard of proof is required to civilly commit an individual to a mental hos-
pital); see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (holding that, to be
civilly committed, a person must be both mentally ill and dangerous).
224. See Kirschner, supra note 129, at 261 (noting that until the insanity acquittee is
found not guilty by reason of insanity, he or she is a criminal defendant).
225. See Note, supra note 187, at 1260-61 (arguing that "[als long as the dangerousness
standard is a constant, dangerous persons not mentally ill are by definition just as danger-
ous (as a group) as dangerous persons who are mentally ill").
226. See E. Michael Coles & Faye E. Grant, Detention of Accused Persons Found Not
Guilty by Reason of Insanity: Diversion or Preventive Treatment, 10 HEALTH L. IN CAN-
ADA 239, 245 (1990) (explaining that the mentally ill are generally no more dangerous
than people who are not mentally ill and "as a group, present a lower risk of committing
a violent act against others 1).
227. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1790 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurng).
228. Id.
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Equal Protection Clause. There is no accurate way to determine the
length of the sentence the insanity acquittee would have actually
served in prison and, therefore, compared to random prisoners
convicted of the same crime, the insanity acquittee may still be
held longer. Prisoners can have their sentences reduced for good
behavior or be released on shock probation229 A person tried for
the same crime also has the opportunity to plea bargain to receive
a shortened sentence"0 whereas an insanity acquittee may be de-
tained for a predetermined time period.
The time an insanity acquittee actually is confined is not an
adequate measure of the effect that being labeled "insane" has on
his or her life. An insanity acquittee has a greater loss in liberty
than a convicted criminal because he or she is branded both cnmi-
nal and insane." If such a stigma could even be quantified, fur-
ther detention based on dangerousness would pose a greater burden
on an insanity acquittee than on a convicted cnrmnal. Equating an
insanity acquittees' detention period with that of a convicted crmi-
nal may also reveal an intent to punish which would violate the
Due Process Clause. 2 Under both a due process and an equal
protection analysis, a statute allowing continued commitment of
insanity acquittees on the basis of dangerousness alone would be
unconstitutional.
V CONCLUSION
There is a great danger that by making one constitutional ex-
ception for the commitment of dangerous insanity acquittees, the
constitutional protections we all rely on will be eroded. "The most
striking feature of preventive detention is its capacity to swallow
up the whole of the criminal justice system." 3 One "due process
229. See generally VAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 26 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing sentence reduction and probation).
230. Id. § 21.1, at 900-01.
231. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980) ("The loss of liberty produced by
an involuntary commitment is more than a loss of freedom from confinement."); see also
German & Singer, supra note 9, at 1011 (arguing that because of the stigma of being
labeled crazy and criminal, insanity acquittees are often "in a worse position than if they
had been convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned").
232. See supra notes 131-78 and accompanying text (discussing due process concerns).
233. Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 141, at 357; see also United States v.
Melendez-Carnon, 790 F.2d 984, 1000 (2d Cir.) (noting that even though under our Con-
stitution the Government could not jail innocent people solely to prevent them from com-
mitting a crime. "such a police state approach would undoubtedly be a rational means of
advancing the compelling state interest in public safety"), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 978
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exception" can lead to another and another until there is nothing
left of the protections of the Due Process Clause. In his dissenting
opimon in Salerno, Justice Marshall stated that if the majority's
reasomng were applied, a hypothetical statute placing a curfew on
the unemployed based on the determination that such people were
dangerous would be constitutional.'23 Tius kind of "police state"
seems incompatible with fundamental human rights protected by
the Constitution.
For now, the Supreme Court has upheld the rights of insanity
acquittees not to be held solely on the basis of dangerousness. If a
more narrowly defined statute than Louisiana's comes before this
Court, this may change."3 Although the opinions of lifetime ap-
pointees to the Supreme Court may be inflexible, we can influence
the legislation passed by those we elect. Also, we can be aware
that the stones reported by the media of "dangerous" insanity
acquittees being released or of crimes comrmtted by acquittees
following release only reflect a small minonty of the cases in
wich insanity acquittees are released. Finally, we can encourage
the passage of legislation which imposes a stringent form of condi-
tional release to ease societal fears. The constitutional protections
afforded to everyone in this society are too important to compro-
inse in order to seek relief from the perceived danger of a few
REBECCA FRANK DALLET
(1986).
234. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 760 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
235. See, e.g., In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1006-07 (Wash. 1993) (finding support in
Foucha to uphold a state statute permitting indefinite commitment in a mental health
facility, based solely on dangerousness, of individuals who have already served sentences
for sex crimes).
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